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INTRODUCTION 
The institutional mandate of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
is to interpret and apply the Treaties of the European Communities 
for the purpose of ensuring that the Member States, the Council of 
the European Communities (Council), the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (Commission) and the European Parliament act 
in conformity with European Community (EC) law.! The ECJ also 
must ensure that Member States comply with the provisions of Co un-
cil regulations2 and implement Council Directives3 in a timely and 
proper manner. 4 The ECJ has not been accorded policy-making 
powers under the Treaties, as the responsibilities for proposing and 
adopting Community legislation is reserved for the Commission and 
t Copyright © 1993 Matthew L. Schemmel and Bas de Regt. 
* B.A. summa cum laude Boston College (1988); J.D. Boston College Law School (1991); 
LL.M. (Hons.) King's College, University of London (1992). Associate, Cosgrove, Eisenberg 
& Kiley, Boston, Massachusetts. 
** Bas de Regt (1964) holds a "meester in de rechten" degree from the Rijks Universiteit 
Gromingen (1991) and an LL.M. from King's College London. At present, he is associated 
with Schenkeveld & Sluis, advocaten, Alkrnacr, The Netherlands. 
1 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 164; see 
generally BERNARD RUDDEN & DERRICK WYATT, BASIC COMMUNITY LAws (2d ed. 1986). 
2 EEC TREATY art. 189. 
3 EEC TREATY art. 189. 
4 EEC TREATY arts. 169, 170, 173, 177. There are four scenarios for issues of environmental 
law to come before the ECJ. First, if a Member State fails to comply with environmental 
protection obligations imposed by EC law, it is the Commission's responsibility under article 
169 to commence proceedings for an infringement of Treaty obligations. EEC TREATY art. 
169. Second, in the absence of a Commission action, a Member State may proceed under 
article 170. EEC TREATY art. 170. Third, issues of EC environmental law may also arise in 
institutional battles brought pursuant to article 173. EEC TREATY art. 173. Finally, environ-
mental issues also may reach the ECl on an article 177 reference from cases instituted against 
a Member State in the National courts. EEC TREATY art. 177. 
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Council respectively.5 The ECl, however, arguably exercises a quasi-
legislative power, insofar as some of its most important judgments 
have been used as a means of filling lacunae in EC law when there 
is no effective answer to be found in the Treaties or in secondary 
legislation.6 In this sense, the ECJ plays an important role in the 
creation of fundamental EC policies.7 
There are few areas of EC law and policy that have been shaped 
and influenced more positively by the jurisprudence of the ECJ than 
the area of environmental protection.s Community environmental 
policy is "a monument to a pragmatic or flexible approach to the 
interpretation of the aims of the European EEC Treaty.''9 For exam-
ple, the ECJ recognized the Community's competence to adopt 
legislation on matters of environmental protection despite the con-
spicuous absence of the word "environment" from the original text 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC Treaty or Treaty) .10 The ECJ later went on to declare environ-
mental protection a "mandatory requirement" of Community lawY 
5 EEC TREATY art. 189. Article 189 states: "[i]n order to carry out their task the Council 
and the Commission shall, in accordance with the provisions of this treaty, make regulations, 
issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions." See also EEC 
TREATY arts. 100a, 149; The Treaty on European Union and Final Act, tit VII, amended arts. 
100a, 189b, 311.L.M. 253, 263, 297-298 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. Both the Cooperation 
and Co-Decision Procedures are designed in part to give the European Parliament a more 
effective voice in the creation of EC legislation. 
6 See generally Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend 
en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastinger, 1963 E.C.R. 1 [hereinafter Van Gend 
en Laos]; Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs 
d'Huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531; Case 70/88, European Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 
2067;Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Frankovich and Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 
[hereinafter Frankovich]; Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4269. 
7 Some commentators have been critical of the ECl's judicially active approach to the 
interpretation of the Treaty and EC legislation. See Rene Barents, The Internal Market Unlim-
ited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation, 30 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 
85,87 n.17-20 (1993); see also Hjalte Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and Activism: AJudicial 
Policy for the European Court, 13 EUR. L. REv. 28, 31 (1988). 
8 See generally Phillipe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: Legislation, the EC] 
and Common Interest Groups, 53 MOD. L. REV. 685 (1990);Jackie Minor, The European Court 
of Justice as an Environmental Tribunal, CECLD Series-EC Environmental and Planning Law 
267-77 (1990); Ludwig Kramer, The Implementation of EC Environmental Directives within 
Member States: Some Implications of the Direct Effect Dodrine, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 39 (1991). 
9 David Freestone, European Community Environmental Policy and Law, 18 J.L. & SOC'Y 135 
(1991). 
10 See Joined Cases 91 & 92/79, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian 
Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 1099, 1099 [hereinafter Joined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. 1099]. 
The Community explicitly incorporated environmental protection into the Treaty with the 
adoption of the Single European Act. EEC TREATY art. 130r-130t. 
11 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 4630. 
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Single European Act12 case law reveals the ECl's willingness to look 
beyond the plain meaning of language in Treaty articles13 and EC 
secondary legislation14 to give effect to the Community's environ-
mental protection policies. Thus, Community institutions, Member 
States, Community citizens, and the lawyers that represent them 
should expect the ECl to take a dynamic approach to the interpre-
tation and application of Community environmental laws when en-
suring the effectiveness of a Community environmental protection 
policy. 15 
A number of the ECl's "landmark" decisions, some of which 
specifically address environmental issues and others that indirectly 
12 See generally EEC 'TREATY (as amended 1986) [hereinafter AMENDED EEC TREATY]; see 
also 1987 OJ. (L 169) l. 
13Case 187/87, Saarland v. Minister of Industry, 1 C.M.L.R. 529, 532-543 (1989). In this 
case the applicants relied on the direct effect of article 37 and brought an action in France's 
National courts. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY [EURA-
TOM TREATY] art. 37. Upon an article 177 reference, the EC] held: 
[a]rticle 37 can achieve its purpose only if it is interpreted to mean that it requires 
the Community to be furnished with the general data concerning a plan for the 
disposal of radioactive effluents before such disposal is finally authorized. Such an 
interpretation, which is able to safeguard the necessary effect of the provision, must be 
given priority in accordance with the Court's settled case law. 
EURATOM TREATY art. 37 (emphasis added). Case 187/87, Saarland v. Minister of Industry, 1 
C.M.L.R. at 542. 
14 See Case 359/88, Zanetti 1990 E.C.R. 1-1518, 1-1518,1522. The EC] held that for purposes 
of Council Directives 75/442 and 78/319, the term "waste" must be broadly construed to 
include materials that were incapable of being put to an economic "re-use" and also materials 
that were capable of being recycled or re-used in some way. Id. at 1522. The Italian imple-
menting legislation sought to define "waste" more restrictively, so as to exclude materials that 
were capable of being recycled or put to some other economic use. See id. at 1519-1520. 
15 But see Diedre Curtain, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives 
in the Common Law Context, 15 EUR. L. REv. 195, 195 (1990). Curtain argues: 
the court's case law bears increasing witness to its embarkment on the path of 
minimalism by sub silentio subscribing to the philosophy that, in the absence of 
consensus by the actors on the political stage, it is not the role of the court to step 
in and randomly fill lacunae which appear. 
Id. Curtain supports this assertion by citing Case 302/87, European Parliament v. Council 
(the "Comitology" case), wherein the ECJ ruled that the European Parliament did not have 
competence to bring an action under article 173. 1988 E.C.R. 5637, 5640. In subsequent 
jurisprudence, however, Case 70/88, European Parliament v. Council, the EC] largely over-
turned "Comitology" and recognized the European Parliament's right to bring an action 
under article 173 to protect its prerogatives under the Treaty. 1990 E.C.R. 2067, 2073. The 
ECJ held for the Parliament despite that institution's absence from the plain wording of article 
173, thereby exhibiting something quite different from a "minimalist" approach. Id. at 2071-
74. The EC] subsequently reaffirmed, inter alia, the European Parliament's competence under 
article 173 in Case C-295/90, European Parliament v. Council, 7 July 1992, not yet reported. 
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affect Community environmental policy, illustrate this dynamic ap-
proach.16 This article examines some of these decisions and discusses 
their implications for the continuing development of an effective 
Community environmental protection policy. Despite Denmark's 
and England's intransigence in ratifying17 the Maastricht Treaty 
(Maastricht), its provisions recently have become part of Community 
law.1s Thus, at various points, this article discusses Maastricht's rele-
vant provisions regarding environmental protection. 
Part I of this article examines developments in the law of EC 
environmental protection policy, with an emphasis on the ECl's 
decisions in both Commission v. Council cases (Titaniam Dioxide19 
and Waste Directive). 20 The discussion focuses on Treaty articles 
100a and 130s, and the battle among the Commission, Council, 
European Parliament, and Member States to establish a primary 
legal basis for Community secondary legislation concerning the 
environment. Part I also considers the ECJ's role in defining the 
scope of the European Parliament's powers under the Single Euro-
pean Act and particularly how the Parliament may use those powers 
to promote stronger EC environmental protection policies. Finally, 
Part I also considers the Maastricht provisions on the legal basis of 
environmental legislation and discusses the potential for future in-
stitutional battles before the EC]. 
Part II focuses on the often contentious relationship between the 
Community's policy on environmental protection and its policy on 
economic development. Special attention is devoted to the ECl's 
landmark decision in Danish Bottles.21 The principles of "sustainabil-
ity" and "subsidiarity," as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty also are 
addressed. Part III provides a brief overview of developments in the 
16The authors have studied the cases that have been translated into English, Dutch, or 
French as of July 1, 1993. Some cases have not been reported officially but unofficial transla-
tions are on file with the authors. 
17 SeeEEC 'TREATY art. 236. Article 236 states: "[t] he amendments [to the Treaty Establishing 
the European ~conomic Community] shall enter into force after being ratified by all the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." EEC 'TREATY 
art. 236 (emphasis added); see also The Road Ahead/or Maastricht, ECONOMIST,July 31,1993, 
at 26. 
18 See generally Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5; see also Robert Rice, High Court Rejects 
Maastricht Challenge, FIN. TiMES WEEKEND,July 31/Aug. 1,1993, at 7. 
19 Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2878 [hereinafter Titanium Diox-
ide]. 
20 Case G155/91, Commission v. Council, 17 March 1993, not yet reported (French trans-
lation on file with authors). 
21 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. at 4607; see generally Ludwig Kramer, 
Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 111 (1993). 
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doctrine of Direct Effect, because a great majority of Community 
secondary legislation in the area of environmental protection is 
adopted in the form of Directives. This section focuses on the ECl's 
decisions in Foster v. British GaS,22 and Frankovich and Bonifaci v. 
Italian Republic.23 Finally, this article concludes with an overview of 
the status of current EC environmental policy and briefly assesses 
the direction of such policy in light of the ECl's active approach to 
interpreting the Treaty and Community secondary legislation. 
1. LEGAL BASIS OF EC ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 
A. Before The Single European Act 
The Community's secondary legislation must have a legal basis 
identifiable in an article of the Treaty.24 The ECJ held that the choice 
of a legal basis must be grounded in objective criteria subject to 
judicial review.25 And yet, as Ludwig Kramer stated, "Community 
environmental policy developed and flourished in the absence of 
explicit powers in the original EEC treaty."26 
The combined cases in Commission v. Italy illustrate how the ECJ 
approved the Council's choice of a legal basis for Community envi-
ronmental policy, even though there was no explicit reference to the 
environment in the original EC Treaty.27 The Commission instituted 
an action against Italy for its failure to implement Directives on 
detergents and the amount of sulphur in liquid fuels. 28 The Council 
22 Case C-188/89, 1990 E.C.R. 3343. 
23 Frankovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 5357. 
24 See EEC TREATY art. 190. Article 190 states: "Regulations, directives and decisions of the 
Council and of the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer 
to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty." [d.; 
see also 1979 OJ. (L 268) 1; Barents, supra note 7 at 85. It should be noted that the aim of 
this paper is not to develop a critique of the ECl's decisions in this area, but rather to explain 
these decisions, their reasoning, and their potential implications in the specific context of the 
Community's developing environmental protection policies. See also LUDWIG KRAMER, EEC 
TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31-35 (1990) [hereinafter KRAMER, EEC TREATY]; 
Kieran Bradley, The European Court and Basis of Community Legislation, 13 EUR. L. REv. 
379-402 (1988). 
25 See Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, 1520. 
26 KRAMER, EEC TREATY supra note 24, at 23. 
27Joined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. at 1099,1115. 
28 See EEC TREATY art. 169. Article 169 states: 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation 
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the 
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned 
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selected article lO029 as the Directive's legal basis.30 Italy argued that 
it was not clear from the Treaty that the Community had the power 
to legislate on matters of environmental protection and that the 
measures at issue were actually international agreements in the form 
of Directives.31 The Commission argued that the Directives, which 
were part of a Council program to eliminate technical barriers to 
trade, were based on article 100 because they had a direct effect on 
the establishment and function of the common market. 32 
The EC] held that basing the Directives on article 100 was indeed 
proper, reasoning that they were part of a program to eliminate 
trade barriers.33 But the EC] also recognized the Commission's ar-
gument that measures concerning the environment may impose 
burdens on undertakings and thus distort competition in the ab-
sence of harmonization of national provisions.34 Kramer argued, 
"[ t] he correct interpretation of the Court's judgements must there-
fore be that, if the Community by adopting [environmental] action 
programmes has documented its political view on the measures that 
are to be the subject of Community legislation, there is no need for 
further proof of the necessity for Community action. "35 But regard-
less of what the Community wants to achieve, there always must be 
a proper legal basis for Community secondary legislation.36 Thus the 
ECl's decision in Commission v. Italy is of central importance, as it 
does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission 
the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
EEC TREATY art. 169. 
29EEC TREATY art. 100. Article 100 states: "The Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission, issue Directives for the approximation of such provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affed the estab-
lishment or functioning of the common market." EEC TREATY art. 100 (emphasis added). 
30 1980 E.C.R. at 1103, 1119; 1974 OJ. (L 347) 54; 1975 OJ. (L 307) 22. 
31Joined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. at 1105,1121. 
32 [d. at 1106, 1122. 
33 [d. 
34 !d. For a general discussion of the relationship between legal basis of Community envi-
ronmental policy and the goal of economic integration, see Owen Lomas, Environmental 
Protection, Economic Conflid and the European Community, 33 MCGILL LJ. 504, 510 (1988). 
35 KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24, at 3. 
36 See Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, supra note 25, at 1493; see also PJ.G. KAPTEYN 
ET AL, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 5 (2d ed. L. Gormley 
1987). 
The Court noted that the Directives were adopted within the Environmental Action 
Programme but also that they were adopted under the General Programme for the 
elimination of technical barriers to trade which result from disparities between the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States, 
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implicitly invited the Community institutions to develop a more 
comprehensive environmental protection policy on the basis of ar-
ticle 100.37 
B. Legal Basis and The Single European Act 
The word "environment" finally appeared in the written corpus 
of Community law with the adoption of the Single European Act,38 
and in particular with the incorporation of Title VII, articles 130r, 
130s, and 130t. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Title VII is 
that it provides an explicit legal basis for the creation of Community 
environmentallegislation.39 The Council subsequently adopted im-
portant Community environmental measures based upon article 
130s.40 When a piece of secondary legislation is based upon article 
130s, it must be adopted by a unanimous vote of the Council.4l The 
Parliament, however, only needs to be consulted for an opinion on 
the substance of the measure. 42 Member States also retain the power 
to introduce more stringent national environmental measures than 
adopted by the Council on May 28, 1969. In this sense said the Court, 'it is validly 
founded upon Article 100.' 
[d. (emphasis added). 
37 SeeJoined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. at 1106. Some of the secondary legislation based 
on article 100 and article 235 includes Council Directive on Sulpher liquid fuels. 1987 OJ. 
(L 91) 19; Council Directive on Pollution through Asbestos, 1987 OJ. (L 85) 40; Council 
Directive on Discharge of Dangerous Substances, 1987 OJ. (L 42) 43; Council Directive 
Relating to the Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption, 1980 OJ. (L 229) 11. 
38 See AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130s. 
39 AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130r(I). "Action by the Community relating to the environ-
ment shall have the following objectives: to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
environment; to contribute towards protection of human health; to ensure a prudent and 
rational utilization of natural resources." AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130r(1). 
40 See Council Regulation on Substances That Deplete the Ozone, 1991 OJ. (L 67) 1; 
Amended Council Directive on Waste, 1991 OJ. (L 78) 32; Council Directive on the Freedom 
of Access to Information on the Environment, 1990 OJ. (L 158) 56. 
41 See AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130s. "The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community," with the 
exception that "the Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subpara-
graph, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority." 
AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130s. 
42 Although the Council may not adopt a measure until it has taken into account the 
European Parliament's views, where the consultation procedure is required it is in no way 
legally bound to incorporate those views into the adopted measure, nor is it obliged to 
substantially respond to them. See KAPTEYN ET AL, supra note 36, at 140-42, discussing the 
Parliament's 'consultative' function. "The Council itself is not at all accountable to the 
Parliament for giving effect to the latter's opinions." [d. 
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those taken pursuant to Title VII, as long as the national measures 
are compatible with the Treaty.43 
In addition to the new Maastricht provisions,44 the other possible 
legal basis for adopting Community environmental measures exists 
under article 100a, which amended article 100 and is intended to 
achieve the objectives set out in article Sa, namely the progressive 
establishment of the internal market.45 Article 100a clearly was in-
tended to serve as a potential legal basis for Community environ-
mental protection measures. Article 100a(3) states that proposals on 
"environmental protection" shall "take as a base a high level of 
protection," while article 100a( 4) allows Member States some discre-
tion as to the application of national measures on "protection of the 
environment."46 Some of the Community's secondary environmental 
protection legislation has been based on article 100a.47 The most 
significant implications of basing Community environmental policy 
on article 100a, as opposed to article 130s, are (1) that environ-
mental measures which help achieve the functioning of the internal 
market may be adopted by qualified majority voting48 and (2) Par-
liament must be allowed to "cooperate" with the Council on the 
substance of that legislation.49 
43 See AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 130t. "The protective measures adopted in common 
pursuant to article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing 
more stringent protective measures compatible with this treaty." AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 
130t. 
44 See infra sections D & E of Part I of this article. 
45 See AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 1 OOa (l ). 
By way of derogation from article 100 ... the Council shall, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission in cooperation with the European 
Parliament ... adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 100a(l) (emphasis added). 
46 Often referred to as the ''Thatcher Clause," in reference to former British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher's insistence that it be included in the text of the Single European Act, 
article 100a(4) nevertheless limits the Member State's ability to apply national environmental 
provisions to cases where it can show a major need, i.e. those exceptions, like public security, 
that are listed in article 36. 
47 Council Directive on Pollution Caused by Emissions From Vehicles, 1988 OJ. (L 36) 1; 
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 
1991 OJ. (C 192) 6. 
48 AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 100a. 
49 AMENDED EEC TREATY art. 100a; see also KAPTEYN ET AL, supra note 36, at 142. The 
Cooperation Procedure allows the European Parliament to have two readings of proposed 
legislation. The Parliament will consider legislation proposed by the Commission and give its 
opinion by a simple majority vote. The Council then must reach a "common position" on the 
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Thus, the choice of a legal basis for Community environmental 
legislation is not a purely academic exercise. 
The legal basis of an act [lOOa or 130s] indicates not only 
the objective and nature of the measure which the Com-
munity can adopt [lOOa, measures affecting the function-
ing of the internal market or 130s, measures to protect the 
environment], but also the procedural requirements for its 
adoption [1 OOa, the cooperation procedure or 130s, the 
consultation procedure], the Community institution com-
petent to adopt it [greater Parliament participation under 
100a] and, ... the voting majority in the Council [lOOa, 
qualified majority vote, or 130s, unanimity] .50 
The Treaty does not indicate when article 100a or article 130s should 
serve as the legal basis of Community environmental policy. 
C. The ECJ's Titanium Dioxide Decision 
The ECJ addressed this issue in the case of Commission v. Council 
(Titanium Dioxide).51 In 1983, the Commission presented the Coun-
cil with a proposed Directive on harmonization of Member State 
programs for the reduction of waste from the titanium dioxide 
industry. 52 The proposed Directive was based upon articles 100 and 
235.53 Subsequent to the Single European Act, the Commission 
changed the legal basis of the proposed Directive to article 1 OOa. 54 
The Council, however, rejected article 100a and in its "common 
position" decided to base the Directive on article 130s.55 The Council 
consulted the European Parliament pursuant to article 130s and the 
Parliament, in agreement with the Commission, stated that the Di-
legislation. Parliament then has its second reading and within three months time must 
approve, amend, or reject the common position. If Parliament, by an absolute majority vote, 
amends, or rejects the common position, the Council only may adopt the measure by a 
unanimous vote. The influence that Parliament may have over the content of a measure 
therefore is increased greatly in comparison to the Consultation Procedure, which applies to 
legislation adopted under article 130s. [d. at 140-42. 
50 Bradley, supra note 24, at 380 (emphasis added by the authors). 
51 Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2878. 
52 Council Directive on the Reduction and Ultimate Elimination of Emissions Caused by 
the Titanium Dioxyde Industry, 1983 OJ. (C 138) 5. 
53 [d. 
54 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2897; see also Council Directive on the Estab-
lishment for a Common Procedure to Harmonise the Programs to Diminish and Finally 
Abolish Pollution Through Waste from the Titanium Dioxide Industry, 1989 OJ. (L 201) 56. 
55 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2897; see also 1989 OJ. (C 158) 248. 
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rective should have been based on article 100a, not 130s.56 Never-
theless, the Council ultimately adopted the Directive by a unani-
mous vote under article 130sY The Commission, with the European 
Parliament's intervention, brought an action to annul the Directive 
on grounds that it had been adopted on an improper legal basis. 58 
The Council and Commission agreed that in order to meet the 
ECl's mandate that a legal basis must be founded on objective 
criteria amenable to judicial review,59 it was necessary to establish 
the measure's "center of gravity."60 The "center of gravity" test as-
sumes that a measure may be designed to meet more than one 
Community objective, but the legal basis should be founded in the 
Treaty article most compatible with a measure's primary objective.61 
The Council argued that while the Directive sought internal mar-
ket/ competition policy objectives, the primary objective of Directive 
89/428 is the reduction and ultimate elimination of pollution 
caused by titanium dioxide production and therefore should be 
based on article 130s.62 Conversely, the Commission and European 
Parliament argued that article 100a was the proper legal basis. The 
56 Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2897. 
57 1989 OJ. (L 201) 56. As per the requirements of article 130s, the measure had to be 
adopted by a unanimous Council vote. 
58 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2897; EEC TREATY art. 173. Article 173 states: 
[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Com-
mission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have 
jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Councilor the Commission 
on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural require-
ment, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of powers. 
EEC TREATY art. 173. 
59 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. at 1520. 
60 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2898. 
61 [d. at 2898. But see KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24, at 42. " ... [D]istinctions 
according to the main objective of a measure are not really practicable in law and do not 
provide useful delimitations." [d. 
62 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2898; see also Christian Zacker, Environmental 
Law of the European Economic Community: New Powers Under the SEA, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 249, 273 (1991) . 
. . . [I] ndustrial plant and production standards, such as titanium dioxide emission 
limits, potentially distort competition both within the individual Member States 
concerned and within the Community as a whole. They do not, however, influence 
trade or competition outside the Community, and should thus be based on either 
article 130s or article 100. 
[d.; see also Scott Crosby, The Single Market and the Rule of Law, 16 EUR. L. REv. 451,459 
(1991). " ... [W]here the Treaty provides appropriate specific legal bases other than 100a, 
the former and not the latter must be selected." [d. 
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Directive's primary objective was to establish a level playing field for 
competition between titanium dioxide producers, thereby improv-
ing conditions for achieving the internal market.63 
The ECJ scrutinized the language of Directive 89/42864 and found 
that the provision addressed both the need to reduce/eliminate 
waste from the titanium dioxide industry as well as the need to 
harmonize titanium dioxide production so as to improve competi-
tive conditions.65 Thus, rather than having a "center of gravity" or 
primary objective, the ECJ found that the Directive had a dual, 
inextricably connected concern for protecting the environment and 
achieving an effective internal market.66 
Citing its own case law, the ECJ stated that the Directive, which 
had characteristics of an environmental measure adoptable under 
130s and an internal market measure adoptable under 100a, ordi-
narily would be based on both relevant Treaty provisions.67 The ECJ 
ruled, however, that the Directive lawfully could not be based on 
both 130s and 100a,68 because a concomitant reliance on the respec-
tive articles would deprive the European Parliament of essential 
institutional powers granted to them under the "cooperation proce-
dure" in article 100a.69 Under the cooperation procedure, as re-
quired by article 100a, the Council only needs to reach a qualified 
majority vote to adopt the European Parliament's proposed amend-
ments to the Council's common position.70 If the Council's common 
position is rejected by the European Parliament or the Council 
wishes to amend the Commission's second proposal, re-drafted in 
light of the European Parliament's amendments, the Council must 
act unanimously.71 But, as the ECJ noted, if both 100a and 130s were 
relied upon as the Directive's legal basis, the Council still would be 
required to vote unanimously in accordance with article 130s's re-
quirements, thereby effectively avoiding the European Parliament's 
input under the cooperation procedure.72 The ECJ recognized that 
the cooperation procedure enhanced the European Parliament's 
63 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2898; see also KRAMER, EEC 'TREATY, supra note 
24, at 46-47. 
64 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2898-2899. 
65 See id. 
66Id. at 2899. 
67Id. at 2900, (citing Case 165/87, Commission v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5545, 5561). 
68Id. 
69 Id.; see also EEC TREATY arts. 100a, 149. 
70EEC TREATY arts. 100a, 149. 
7J EEC TREATY arts. 100a, 149. 
72 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19 at 2900. 
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ability to affect the substance of Community legislation and reflected 
a "fundamental democratic principle" of citizen participation 
through its directly elected Community institution.73 Thus, the EC] 
concluded that to maintain the powers extended to the European 
Parliament under the Treaty, it was necessary to determine whether 
article 100a or 130s was the appropriate legal basis of the Directive.74 
The EC], in a characteristically dynamic approach, held that the 
Council improperly based Directive 89/428 on article 130s and 
should have selected article 100a as the appropriate legal basis.75 The 
EC] reasoned based on article 130r(2), that a measure need not be 
based on article 130s for the sole reason that it contains a concern 
for environmental protection.76 The ECl also pointed to the lan-
guage of article 100a(3), which states that measures adopted to 
achieve the internal market shall take a high level of protection with 
regard to health, safety, and the environment. Thus, the ECl con-
cluded that the goal of environmental protection articulated in 
article 130s could be achieved effectively under article 100a.77 Most 
importantly, the EC] stated that measures which are required to 
protect the environment can, in the absence of harmonized national 
73Id. 
74Id. at 2901. 
75 Id.; see DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 369 (3d ed. 
1993). 
However, legal bases must not be combined if the procedures which they prescribe 
are incompatible. Thus the Court has held that it is impossible for an act to be based 
on Treaty Articles one of which provides for the co-operation procedure, while the 
other requires the Council to act unanimously after simple consultation of the 
European Parliament. In such cases, it seems preference should be given to the former 
legal basis, as providing a reinforced role for the European Parliament on the legislative 
process, so long as the different objectives of the proposal are capable of being 
furthered by legislation based on the Article in question. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
76 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2901; see also Case 62/88, Greece v. Council, 1990 
E.C.R. 1545, 1550. In Greece v. Council, the ECJ held that article 113 (requiring a qualified 
majority vote) was the correct legal basis for Council Regulation 3955/87 on levels of radiation 
in agricultural products imported from third countries. Id. at 1551. Greece argued, inter alia, 
that articles 130r and 130s, possibly with article 235, formed the correct legal basis. The ECl 
disagreed, stating: 
articles 130r and 130s are intended to confer powers on the Community to undertake 
specific action on environmental matters. Those articles, however, leave intact the 
powers held by the Community under other provisions of the Treaty, even if the 
measures to be taken under the latter provisions pursue at the same time any of the 
objectives of environmental protection. 
Id. at 1550. The ECJ similarly reasoned in the Titanium Dioxide decision, and therefore 
supported a more comprehensive EC environmental policy. 
77 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2901. 
1994] EC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 65 
laws, distort competition.78 Therefore, the ECJ determined that a 
measure like Directive 89/428, intended to approximate national 
laws in a specific industry and thereby avoid distortions in competi-
tion, contributes to the establishment and function of the internal 
market, and therefore should be based on article 1 OOa. 79 The ECl 
subsequently declared the Directive void.80 
The judgment in Titanium Dioxide exemplifies the ECl's dynamic 
approach to interpreting the Treaty and may contribute to a strength-
ened Community environmental policy. First, it seems clear that the 
Commission will seek to base a significant amount of future and 
pending Community environmental legislation on article IOOa. The 
Commission increasingly may draft its proposals with language that 
sets out the dual objectives of environmental protection and the 
avoidance of unfair or distorted competition. The Commission can 
argue persuasively that a significant number of Community meas-
ures intended to protect the environment share the dual aim of 
achieving the internal market, as even the slightest difference 
among national laws arguably may distort competition within par-
ticular industries.81 Additionally, in light of Denmark's, England's, 
and Germany's Maastricht ratification battles,82 it is significant that 
the Titanium Dioxide case may extend qualified majority voting in 
the area of Community environmen tal policy, as required by article 
lOOa.83 Qualified majority voting may aid the efficient adoption of 
stronger environmental policy as it will prevent one or even two 
large Member States, England and Italy for example, from vetoing 
tough environmental measures. 
78Joined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. at 1115; see KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24, 
at 46-47. 
It had already been clarified by Court rulings before the entry into force of the Single 
European Act that environmental provisions could be based on article 100; there is 
nothing to suggest that the change over to decisions by qualified majority in article 
100a has changed this position in any way. 
KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24, at 46-47. 
79 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19 at 2901. 
80 [d. at 2901-2902. 
81 But see Case 155/91, Commission v. Council, '1'1 18-22 (not yet reported). It is clear that 
a Community measure designed to enhance environmental protection only should be based 
on article 100a where achievement of the internal market is an additional "aim" of the 
measure, as opposed to a mere "side effect" that results from the measure's imposition. [d. 
82 But see Editorial Comments, Taking Stock: 1992 and Beyond, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1 
(1993). 
83 Maastricht amended both articles 130s and 100a to extend qualified majority voting in 
most instances, while retaining a unanimous vote in other sensitive areas. Maastricht Treaty, 
supra note 5, tit VII, 31 I.L.M. at 263, 286. 
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Third, the ECl's enthusiastic "endorsement" of the cooperation 
procedure may not only mean greater powers for the European 
Parliament, but indirectly may result in strengthened Community 
environmental measures.84 The European Parliament has shown 
"Green" inclinations. Thus, it may use the cooperation procedure 
to influence the Council for greater environmental protection meas-
ures.85 
Finally, as stated above, the power of the Member States to take 
unilateral action after the Community has adopted an environmen-
tal measure is clearer under article 130t than it is under article 
lOOa( 4). Thus, the Titanium Dioxide decision represents a diminu-
tion in the Member States' power via the Councip6 Furthermore, 
the decision is a victory for the proponents of establishing environ-
mental protection standards at the Community level. 
D. One Step Up, Two Steps Back? 
Common responses to the ECl's Titanium Dioxide decision 
ranged from caution87 to criticism.88 With the recent decision in 
a subsequent case involving the legal basis of the Community's 
amended Directive on waste,89 there is bound to be a flood of new 
commentary. Arguably, the ECl's recent decision in Commission v. 
84 See EEC TREATY art 100a. But see Barents, supra note 7, at 95, which opines that the 
choice of article 100a as the legal basis is not based on a primary concern for the European 
Parliament's powers. 
85 See Zacker, supra note 62, at 253. " ... [T]he influence of the Parliament over policy 
matters is not insignificant. Especially in light of the 1989 EEC Parliamentary elections, whi~h 
added thirty new members of Parliament from 'Green' parties, environmental advocacy is 
likely to gain force in Community politics." [d.; see also Stanley Crossick, The New European 
Parliament: Policies, Priorities and Personalities, 139 NEW LJ. 1345 (1989). 
86 See infra, note 49 and accompanying text. 
87 See, e.g., WYATT & DAsHwooD, supra note 75, at 372. "It would be premature to conclude 
from the Titanium Dioxide judgement that any Community measure for the protection of 
the environment which has a tendency to equalise conditions of competition must, for that 
reason, be based on article 100a." [d. at 451. 
88 See, e.g., Crosby, supra note 62, at 451. 
[d. 
In Titanium Dioxide, the Court of Justice gave a wide but not all embracing inter-
pretation to article 100a. This judgment, however, does not invalidate but tends to 
confirm the arguments supporting the thesis that article 100a is being misused. A 
reversal of this dangerous trend is necessary in the interest of the rule of law and 
the Community. 
89 Council Directive 91/156, EEC on Elimination of Waste, amending Directive 75/442, 
1991 OJ. (L 78) 32 [hereinafter Waste Directive]. 
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Council (Waste Directive) refines the principles adumbrated in Tita-
nium Dioxide rather than reverses them.90 
In Waste Directive, the Commission and Parliament brought an 
action for annulment91 of the EC's amended Directive on the elimi-
nation of waste.92 The Commission and Parliament invoked the 
identical arguments they successfully relied upon in Titanium Diox-
ide to assert that the amended Waste Directive should have been 
adopted under article 100a as opposed to 130s.93 The Commission 
and Parliament reasoned that the Directive sought to impose a 
common arrangement among the Member States for the removal 
and elimination of waste, and it therefore contained the dual aims 
of achieving both environmental protection and an internal mar-
ket.94 As in Titanium Dioxide, the Council argued that the amended 
Waste Directive was concerned primarily with environmental protec-
tion and therefore was based properly on article 130s.95 
The ECl began its decision by reiterating that the choice of a 
Directive's legal basis must be based on the objective criterion of 
content and aim and must be amenable to judicial review.96 In 
considering the language utilized in the Directive's preamble, the 
ECJ determined that it was intended to apply to the removal and 
elimination of all types of waste regardless ofits source, that Member 
States are obliged to control the removal of waste, and that waste 
should be eliminated as close to its source as possible.97 
The Commission's argument that the Directive should have been 
based on article 100a largely hinged on the fact that waste must be 
considered a "good" in accordance with article 30, and is thus 
subject to the rules on the free movement of goods.98 But the ECl 
concluded that environmental protection is a mandatory require-
ment of EC law and that in such circumstances limitations of the 
free movement of goods are allowable.99 Although the ECl admitted 
90Case 155/91 17 March 1993 (not yet reported, available in French). 
91 [d., 3. 
92 See generally Waste Directive, supra note 89. 
93 [d. , 5. 
94 [d. 
95 [d. , 6. 
96 [d. , 7. 
97 Waste Directive, supra note 89, 1: 8. The ECJ specifically mentioned that the Directive did 
not draw a distinction between domestic and industrial waste. [d., 10. 
98 [d. n 11-12. 
99 [d. " 13-l4. Thus, the ECJ determined that requirements that waste be processed as 
close to its source as is possible, and that transboundary movement of waste be limited did 
not violate article 30. [d. , 14. 
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that some elements of the Directive would have some affect on the 
functioning of the internal market,IOO it concluded that this was 
merely a "side effect" of the overarching goal of establishing an 
effective system for the processing and elimination of waste.101 The 
ECJ also held that basing a Directive on article 100a is not justified 
merely because some elements may effect the functioning of the 
internal market.102 Thus, the ECJ held that article 130s was the 
proper legal basis and dismissed the action.103 
The Waste Directive decision is significant for numerous reasons. 
First, the ECJ has breathed new life into article 130s.104 Mter the 
decision in Titanium Dioxide, it was unclear whether article 130s 
would maintain any significance as a potential legal basis for secon-
dary legislation.l05 But the Waste Directive decision represents a firm 
acknowledgment that measures which are concerned primarily with 
environmental protection most likely will be based on article 130s.106 
Second, although some commentators may disagree,107 the ECl's 
decision in Waste Directive has not overruled the reasoning and 
decision in the previous Titanium Dioxide case. lOB In Waste Direc-
tive, the ECJ is careful to distinguish its reasoning from that em-
ployed in Titanium Dioxide and acknowledges that the facts sur-
rounding the two decisions are crucially different.109 The factual 
distinction of the greatest importance is that the Directive inter-
preted in Titanium Dioxide concerned a very specific type of pollu-
tion and a very specific source, namely the titanium dioxide produc-
ing industryYo In circumstances where an EC Directive singles out 
a specific industry and thereby seeks to regulate the production of 
a specific type of product, the fairness and equality of the competi-
100Id.1I 16. 
101Id. n 17-19. 
102Waste Directive, supra note 89, 'I 20. The ECl distinguished its reasoning and conclusion 
in this case from its reasoning and decision in the Titanium Dioxide case. See id. In TiIanium 
Dioxide, the Eel held that protection of the environment and maintaining a level playing 
field for producers of tiIanium dioxide were dual, inextricably bound aims of the Directive. 
See TiIanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2899. In Waste Directive, the ECJ concluded that 
environmentitl protection was the single aim of the Directive and that any impact on the 
functioning of the internal market resulted merely as a side effect of that aim. Waste Directive, 
supra note 89, 'I 21. 
103Id. 'I 21. 
104 Id. '1'1 20-21. See EEC TREATY art. 130s. 
105 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2901. 
106 See Waste Directive, supra note 89, '1'1 19-20. 
107 See Ann Wachsmann, 31 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 1051, 1062-63 (1993). 
108 See Waste Directive, supra note 89, 'I 20. 
109 Id. 
no See TiIanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2878-2880. 
1994] EC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 69 
tive business environment is effected immediately and unequivo-
cally. This fact underlined the ECl's reasoning in Titanium Dioxide, 
and led the Court to conclude that the aims of maintaining com-
petitive equality in the titanium dioxide industry and enhancing the 
environment could not be separated, but were in fact dual aims of 
the Directive. lll 
In contrast, the Directive interpreted in Waste Directive consti-
tuted a general scheme for the processing and elimination of waste 
without regard to its source. ll2 Further, the ECJ emphasized that the 
Directive's preamble made explicit reference to the fact that pollu-
tion should be processed close to its source and that Member States 
should place limits on its movement.1l3 Not only are intra-industry 
competitive pressures left unaddressed in the ECl's interpretation 
of the Waste Directive, but by its very language the Directive seeks 
to place certain limitations on the free movement of goods,u4 Under 
these factually distinctive circumstances, it was proper for the ECJ 
to distinguish its Waste Directive decision from Titanium Dioxide 
and to conclude that article 130s is the waste Directive's proper legal 
basis.115 In Waste Directive, however, the ECl left the door open for 
its reasoning in Titanium Dioxide to be used at a later date and 
under factual circumstances closer to those present in that case.ll6 
The decision is bound to have an effect on the propriety of choice 
of a legal basis after the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. 
E. Legal Basis and the Maastricht Treaty 
The Titanium Dioxide and Waste Directive cases allowed the ECJ 
to clarity some questions and ambiguities about the proper legal 
basis of Community environmental legislation. With the Maastricht 
Treatyll7 as a component of Community law, however, there are new, 
even more vexing questions surrounding the legal basis of Commu-
nity environmental policy that the ECJ will have to resolve. The 
Maastricht Treaty substantially amends the language in articles 100a, 
130r, 130s, and 130t.1l8 As a result, there are now at least four 
different ways to adopt secondary Community legislation on the 
III See id. at 290l. 
112 See Waste Directive, supra note 89, '1'1 2,9,10. 
113 See id. 'I 9. 
114 See id. '1'1 13-15. 
115 See id. '1'1 20-2l. 
116 See id. 'I 20. 
117 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, 31 I.L.M. at 253-373. 
118 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit VII, arts. 100a, 130r, 130s, 130t, 31 I.L.M. at 263, 286. 
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environment. First, the procedural structure articulated in article 
100a of the Single European Act has been extended to article 
130s(1) of the Maastricht Treaty.ll9 Consequently, the Commission 
will be able to draft proposals primarily or even exclusively intended 
to pursue goals of environmental protection, and in most cases the 
Council will be obliged to adopt such proposals by a qualified ma-
jority vote in cooperation with the European Parliament. If the 
Waste Directive decision represents a setback for the scope of 
qualified majority voting in the environmental protection area, the 
amended article 130s restores its strength.120 
Second, article 130s(2) of the Maastricht Treaty entails certain 
"sensitive" areas where Community environmental policy still will be 
adopted by a unanimous Council vote, in mere consultation with 
the European Parliament.l2l Arguably, article 130s(2) reflects the 
Member States' unwillingness to give up control over what are 
deemed traditional state functions, i.e. the power to impose taxes, 
to establish an energy policy, and the powers of eminent domain. 
Additionally, amended article 130s(3) introduces the concept of a 
"co-decision"122 between the Council and the European Parliament 
on measures concerning the Community's general environmental 
action programs.123 These measures shall be adopted by a qualified 
majority vote. 124 The co-decision procedure represents a significant 
strengthening of the European Parliament's powers, insofar as it 
allows the Parliament to veto measures it deems unsatisfactory.125 
Before a proposal is vetoed, however, the procedure provides for the 
creation of a Conciliation Committee, where the Council and an 
equal number of European Parliamentarians will meet and attempt 
to reach a consensus. 126 
119 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(1), 311.L.M. at 286. 
120 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(1), 311.L.M. at 286. 
121 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(2), 31 I.L.M. at 286. These areas include: 
1) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature; 2) measures concerning town and country planning, 
land use with the exception of waste management, measures of a general nature, and man-
agement of water resources; 3) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. 
122 Maasticht Treaty, supra note 5, tit VII, art. 189B, 31 I.L.M. at 296-297. 
123Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(3), 31 I.L.M. at 286. This is the 
Community's fifth environmental action program. Towards Sustainability: A European Com-
munity Program of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Devel-
opment, COM(92)23. 
124 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 189B, 31 I.L.M. at 296-297. 
125 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, arts. 189B(5),(6), 311.L.M. at 297. 
126 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII art. 189B(4), 31 I.L.M. at 297. 
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The fourth legal basis for Community environmental legislation 
exists under Maastricht amended article 100a. Article 100a still will 
require the Council to adopt measures by qualified majority vote, 
but will replace the cooperation procedure with the co-decision 
procedure.127 The incorporation of the co-decision procedure is 
arguably the Community's most earnest effort to reduce the so-
called "Democratic Deficit."128 
The Maastricht amendments ultimately will lead to litigation be-
tween Community institutions regarding the proper legal basis of 
Community environmental protection legislation. Once again, the 
ECJ will be called upon to interpret the Maastricht amendments. 
Community institutions should expect the ECJ to continue to inter-
pret them in a way that furthers the effectiveness of the Community's 
environmental protection policy. 
For example, potentially the Commission and the European Par-
liament129 may bring an action against the Council for the annul-
ment of a measure the Council adopts pursuant to the amended 
article 130s (2), as opposed to 130s (l). Amended article 130s (l) 
should be relied upon as the primary legal basis for most Commu-
nity environmental legislation, as the language of 130s(2) states that 
it is to be used in derogation of the former and only under limited 
circumstances. 13o The language used to delineate when article 
130s(2) may be used is, however, general and unclear.131 The Council 
surely will interpret the categories that fall within article 130s(2) 
broadly, as reliance on article 130s(2) requires unanimous voting, 
allows Member States to retain veto power, and the Parliament only 
127 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 100a, 31 I.L.M. at 263. 
128The "Democratic Deficit" in the European Community stems from the perception that 
unelected officials, mainly the Commission and the EG], have too much power over the shape 
of EC policy, whereas the directly elected European Parliament has very limited powers. The 
extension of the European Parliament's veto power to the great amount of EC secondary 
legislation that will be based on the amended article 100a significantly increases its institu-
tional powers. 
129 See supra note 15, (discussing Case 70/88, European Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 
2067). If the principles enunciated therein are extended to the hypothetical mentioned above 
and the Commission agrees with the Council that a certain measure should be based on the 
amended article 130s(2), Parliament will have standing to protect its prerogatives (the right 
to cooperate with the Council under amended 130s(1) and not to be merely consulted under 
amended 130s(2) in an action for annulment). 
130 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, arts. 130s(1)-(2), 31 I.L.M. at 286. 
131 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, arts. 130s(1)-(2), 31 I.L.M. at 286. For 
example, who determines, and what is the criteria used to determine, whether a provision is 
"primarily of a fiscal nature?" What are the parameters of "waste management," and what 
constitutes a "measure of a general nature?" What is the "general structure" of a Member 
State's energy supply? These are all issues that potentially could come before the EC]. 
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needs to be consulted. Thus, the Council may attempt to base 
environmental protection provisions that would be adopted under 
article 130s(1) on article 130s(2) instead. Arguably, the ECJ would 
rule in favor of the Commission and/or the European Parliament 
if they should be confronted with such an action for annulment. 
The ECJ consistently has held that derogations and exceptions 
within the Treaty should be construed strictly and applied nar-
rowly.132 Conversely, the ECl demonstrated its willingness to interpret 
the Treaty in a way that makes Community environmental policy 
effective.133 Because article 130s(2) increases the power of a single 
Member State to veto certain types of secondary legislation concern-
ing the environment, only a strict interpretation of article 130s(2) 's 
applicability would be consistent with the ECl's jurisprudence in the 
area of Community environmental protection policy. 
The Commission, in reliance on the ECl's decisions in Titanium 
Dioxide and Waste Directive, will continue to rely on the amended 
article 100a as the legal basis for some of its proposals on Commu-
nity environmental legislation. Nevertheless, the Council may dis-
agree with the Commission and instead seek to adopt a measure 
on the basis of the amended article 130s(1).134 Although both arti-
cles oblige the Council to act by a qualified majority vote, under 
the amended article 100a the European Parliament has co-decision 
rights, and thus a veto power. Under 130s(1), however, the Council 
only needs to cooperate with the European Parliament.135 If the 
Council adopts an environmental measure under 130s(1), and the 
Commission or Parliament subsequently brings an action for annul-
ment, the ECJ will employ a Titanium Dioxide/Waste Directive 
analysis. The ECJ probably will annul the measure if the challenging 
partyl36 can show that achievement of the internal market by reduc-
ing distortions in competition is a serious goal and not merely a 
"side effect."137 Of course, the ECJ will have to refine what level of 
132 For example, see the ECl's jurisprudence in the area of EEC Treaty articles 30-36. The 
EC] has insisted that article 36 must be interpreted strictly and does not extend to justifications 
not mentioned specifically in its language. Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy, 1968 E.C.R. 423. 
133 See supra pp. 5, 7, 15. 
134 Since an amended Treaty article is a completely new Community measure, legally distinct 
from its predecessor, the Titanium Dioxide type case may be re-fought before the EC] in the 
form of amended article 100a and amended article 130s(1). 
135 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, arts. 100a, 130s(1), 311.L.M. at 263,268. 
136The European Parliament certainly would join the Commission in such an action. The 
European Parliament will want to see its Co-Decision rights under the amended article 100a 
protected and promoted in the same way its cooperation rights under article 100a of the 
Single European Act were "endorsed" by the ECl in Titanium Dioxide. 
137 See Waste Directive, supra note 89, 'lI'lI 18-22. 
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concern a particular piece of legislation must have with regard to 
establishment of the internal market in order to clear the "side 
effect" threshold,138 and thereby be deemed a genuine "aim" of the 
Directive. 
The major battle cry will be sounded when the Commission pro-
poses that a carbon tax, or some other economic instrument aimed 
at environmental protection should be based on the amended arti-
cle 100a, and the Council proceeds to adopt the measure under the 
amended article 130s(2).139 The Commission may bring an action 
for annulment arguing that amended article lOOa is the appropriate 
legal basis for measures on carbon taxes and economic instruments 
that address source and industry-specific pollution. Additionally, 
such a Directive is necessary because only a harmonization of envi-
ronmental tax measures will prevent distortions in competition 
within the common market. 140 The ECl's decision in Waste Directive, 
specifically its distinction of the facts and reasoning employed in 
that case from the facts and reasoning in the Titanium decision, cuts 
in favor of the Commission, as such a tax is essentially source and 
industry specific and a failure to harmonize measures would create 
a serious distortion in competition with regard to the costs incurred 
by carbon producers. The Council, on the other hand, will argue 
that taxes and economic instruments are "measures primarily 
of a fiscal nature" and therefore must be adopted under article 
130s(2) .141 
Both the Commission and the Council have sound reasons for 
arguing that a proposed environmental tax or other economic in-
strument should be based on amended article lOOa or 130s(2) 
respectively. It would be disingenuous for the Commission to argue 
that environmental tax measures are not primarily fiscal in nature 
and therefore not within the competence of 130s(2). The Commis-
sion, however, can make a strong argument that the function of the 
internal market would be affected directly and significantly by such 
a measure. Thus, if confronted with a choice between amended 
article 100a and amended article 130s(2), the ECJ should promote 
the democratic principles enshrined in the co-decision procedure, 
and therefore choose amended article 1 OOa. 142 Although the Council 
will argue that the plain language of amended article 130s(2) un-
138 The issue was not addressed squarely in Waste Directive. See id. 
139 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, arts. 100a, 130s(2), 311.L.M. at 263,286. 
14!l Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 100a, 31 I.L.M. at 263. 
141 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(2), 31 I.L.M. at 286. 
142 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130s(2), 31 I.L.M. at 286. 
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doubtedly gives them the power to adopt an environmental tax, the 
ECJ most likely will interpret the Maastricht amendments in a way 
that gives effect to the Community's environmental policy and spurs 
movement towards democratic accountability. In the case of a carb-
on tax, the rationale for acting at the Community level should be 
based on the obvious concerns of maintaining the Treaty's dedica-
tion to a level, competitive economic environment. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the ECJ will overlook the clear language of 130s(2) and 
hold that amended article lOOa is the proper legal basis for a carbon 
tax and for other economic instruments designed to protect and 
preserve the environment. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A. Reconcilable Goals? 
As discussed above, a provlSlon of Community law may aim to 
achieve the goal of environmental protection and the goal of estab-
lishing an internal market simultaneously.143 Thus, arguably, the 
Community's environmental and economic concerns are potentially 
compatible. On the other hand, one can argue that "despite the 
affinity which exists between them, the mutual interests of economic 
integration policy and environmental policy do not always coincide, 
so that progress in integration policy can, as a result, represent a 
setback for environmental protection."144 For example, steady 
economic growth and increased productivity (constitutionally en-
shrined as primary goals of the EC) 145 easily could cause harm to the 
environment, as more factories and more products often create 
more pollution and waste. 
The EC's first attempts at implementing a policy for environ-
mental protection resulted indirectly from the regulation of compe-
tition and the desire to achieve the common market. 146 But achiev-
143 See Titanium Dioxide, supra note 19, at 2898-2899. 
144Lomas, supra note 34, at 507. 
145EEC TREATY art. 2. Article 2 states: 
[tlhe Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continued and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it. 
EEC TREATY art. 2. 
146See Joined Cases 91 & 92/79,1980 E.C.R. at 1102,1106. 
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ing environmental protection goals through measures designed to 
achieve the functioning of the common market exposes a new la-
cuna in the Community legal structure: what happens when eco-
nomic and environmental goals conflict?147 The EC] filled this gap. 
Accordingly, when there is a confrontation between the demands of 
an effective Community environmental protection policy and the 
fundamental Community doctrine on free movement of goods, the 
ECl settles in favor of the environmental policy at issue. 148 
B. Waste Oils and Danish Bottles 
In the Waste Oils case, the EC] held that a Council Directive 
on the disposal of waste oils,149 which included provisions allowing 
Member States to set up a system of zones and permits for the 
collection and disposal of waste oil, ISO did not contravene fundamen-
tal principles of Community law, i.e. free movement of goods and 
freedom of trade. 151 The EC] acknowledged that principles of free 
movement, free competition, and fair trade as fundamental rights 
are "general principles" of Community law that must be ensured. 152 
The EC] stated, however, that the right to fair trade is not unlimited 
and may be restricted by measures which pursue an objective of 
"general interest" to the Community.153 Despite the fact that the 
word "environment" was not in the Treaty text at the time of its 
decision, the ECl concluded that environmental protection was an 
"essential objective" of Community policy, and that the Waste Oils 
Directive sought to ensure that objective in a proportionate and 
non-discriminatory manner. 154 Finally, the ECl held that the French 
147 See Lomas, supra note 34, at 533. 
[d. 
[A) negative effect of the relationship between economic integration and environ-
mental policy, when viewed from the perspective of environmental policy, is that the 
demands of environmental protection tend to become lost in a dispute about how 
far economic integration should go, and to what extent Member States should be 
permitted to hold on to any competitive advantages that they may have. 
14S See generally KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24. Kramer's article provides a more 
exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the environment and the essential Community 
provisions on free movement of goods. 
149 Council Directive 75/439,1975 OJ (L 194) 23 [hereinafter Council Directive 75/439). 
ISO [d. arts. 5-6. 
151 Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs 
d'Huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531. 
152 [d. at 548. 
153 [d. at 549. 
154 [d. 
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implementing legislation, which prohibited the burning of waste oils 
outside state approved facilities, was intended to protect the envi-
ronment and did so without using unnecessarily restrictive methods. 
The French law therefore was held to be consistent with the aims 
and scope of the Waste Oil Directive.155 
The decision in Waste Oils illustrates the ECl's willingness to 
promote the aims of environmental protection, despite the plain 
language of the Treaty. The EC], however, did not address spe-
cifically the language of article 30, nor did it spell out clearly the 
test it would utilize in cases where it is confronted with a conflict 
between the "essential" EC objective of Community environmental 
protection and free movement principles. 
In the Danish Bottles case, the EC] built on and d~rified the 
approach taken in Waste Oils, while concomitantly vaulti~g environ-
mental protection into the forefront of Community consciousness. 156 
Denmark created a compulsory deposit and return system for the 
re-use of drink containers and included a requirement that only 
containers which had been approved previously by the national 
environmental agency could be marketed in Denmark. 157 There was 
an exception for producers to import up to 3,000 hectoliters per 
year in unapproved containers and foreign producers could "test" 
the Danish Market with a limited number of unapproved cans.158 
The Commission, with the United Kingdom intervening, argued 
that the Danish system violated article 30.159 
The EC] held that the bulk of the Danish System was compatible 
with Community law. l60 The EC] reasoned that a recycling program 
was a necessary measure to protect the environment and that a 
compulsory deposit and return system was an essential and propor-
tionate means of implementing the program.161 The ECl concluded, 
however, that the pre-approval requirement did have a dispropor-
tionate effect despite the 3,000 hectoliter exception.162 Additionally, 
the EC] held that any restrictions on trade that resulted from the 
compulsory deposit and return system did not violate article 30.163 
155Id. at 551-552. 
156 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607. 
157Id. at 4608-4609. 
158Id. 
159Id. at 4609; see EEC ThEATY art. 30. 
160 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. at 4627. 
161Id. at 4630. 
162Id. at 4632. 
163Id. at 4630. 
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The ECl's decision in Danish Bottles advanced the cause of envi-
ronmental protection in at least three ways. First, the ECJ declared 
that environmental protection was a "mandatory requirement" un-
der Community law; thereby in effect limiting the application of 
article 30.164 The ECl articulated the doctrine of "mandatory require-
ments" in the Cassis de Dijon decision, where the ECJ held that in 
the absence of Community legislation, Member States may adopt 
measures regarding the marketing of products that result in a re-
striction on free movement in order to satisfy mandatory require-
ments "relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervi-
sion, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions, and the defense of the consumer. "165 Thus, although 
environmental protection is not among the derogations to free 
movement listed in article 36,166 is not mentioned anywhere in the 
original EEC Treaty or in the language of Cassis de Dijon,167 the ECJ 
used the Danish Bottles decision to read environmental protection 
into the "mandatory requirements" doctrine.168 
Second, the ECJ articulated a three part test to clarify what types 
of environmental measures lawfully may restrict the fundamental 
Community provisions on free movement. The ECl reasoned that: 
a) the measure genuinely must be intended to protect the environ-
ment and not be a disguised restriction on trade;169 b) the measure 
164 Id. 
165 Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein, 1979 
E.C.R. 649, 662 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon]. 
166 EEC 'TREATY art. 36. Article 36 states: 
[t] he provisions of articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeologi-
cal value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions 
or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on trade between the Member States. 
EEC TREATY art. 36. 
167 See generally Cassis de Dijon, supra note 165. But see 24 OJ. (C 309), Answer to Written 
Question No. 749/81, by Mr. Bonde: 
[t]he list of such requirements is not exhaustive. It will be the responsibility of the 
Commission when examining individual cases and under the supervision of the 
Court of Justice, to determine which other mandatory requirements may be taken 
into consideration. The protection of the environment may, for example, be considered to 
be a case of this nature. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
16S See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630. 
169 Id. 
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must be indistinctly applicable;170 and c) the measure must fall 
within the EC law principle of proportionality.l7l This test will pro-
vide certainty for Member States as they strive to develop tough 
environmental protection policies. 
Third, the ECl's decision strengthens the power of Member States 
to enact stringent national environmental policies, thereby provid-
ing a spur for tougher policies at the Community level. Advocate 
General, Sir Gordon Slynn concluded that the Danish measures 
were disproportionate and that other methods could have achieved 
a "reasonable standard" of environmental protection without seri-
ously impinging article 30.172 In taking a course of action different 
from that recommended by the Advocate General, the ECJ implicitly 
rejected the "reasonable standard" approach and opted for a more 
effective approach to environmental protection, even at the expense 
of a fundamental Community policy on free movement.173 One can 
argue that the answer to Danish Bottles is to take tougher, more 
comprehensive action at the Community level,l74 It will be more 
difficult for Member States to justifY taking unilateral action under 
article 100a(4) or 130t if the Community already has acted under 
one of those provisions to achieve a high level of environmental 
protection.175 
C. Maastricht: Environment and Economic Development 
I. Sustainability 
The development of a strong European economy was one of the 
most important forces behind the creation of the EEC Treaty.176 As 
noted above, a concern for the environment was not reflected in the 
original Treaty text. Mter the word "environment" finally was incor-
porated by the Single European Act, environmental protection re-
mained a secondary concern to economic development. 
170Id. at 4629. 
171 Id. at 4630. 
172Id. at 4626. 
173 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630. 
174 See Waste Directive, supra note 89, ~~ 13-14. In Waste Directive, the EC] reaffirmed that 
waste is a "good" within the context of article 30, but that environmental protection is a 
mandatory requirement of Community law that can limit the free movement of the waste. Id. 
The EC] concluded that the amended Waste Directive did not violate article 30 and its proper 
interpretation required that waste be processed as close to the place it is produced as possible, 
thereby limiting to the greatest extent possible the transport of waste. Id. ~~ 8, 13, 14. 
175 See KRAMER, EEC TREATY, supra note 24, at 34-39,93-97. 
176EEC TREATY art. 2. 
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It is arguable that the inclusion of the principle of "sustainability," 
as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty, raises concern for the envi-
ronment to the same level as has been accorded to economic devel-
opment.177 The purpose of sustainable development is to set the pace 
of economic growth according to the capacity of the environment 
to absorb the adverse consequences of that growth, thus sustaining 
the health of our eco-system.178 The logical corollary is that if the 
environment cannot sustain further development appropriately, fur-
ther development should not be pursued. Arguably, however, most 
forms of economic development will cause some environmental 
damage, and hence the line at which it becomes unsustainable is a 
difficult one to draw.179 Based upon the approach taken by the EC], 
it most likely will define and apply the concept of sustainable devel-
opment in a way that provides greater protection of the environ-
ment, even where the evidence of actual or potential environmental 
damage is not 100 percent conclusive. ISO 
2. Subsidiarity 
In the Danish Bottles case, Denmark adopted legislation in the 
area of recycling in the absence of a Community measure. lSI The 
power of a Member State to take unilateral action and pass measures 
of environmental protection was enshrined in the Treaty by the 
Single European Act. IS2 At first glance, the Maastricht Treaty seems 
to reaffirm, if not expand, the powers of the Member States to act 
unilaterally by including the principle of subsidiarity.ls3 The princi-
ple of subsidiarity requires Community institutions to take action 
only where the measure cannot be adopted more effectively at a 
177 See, e.g., Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 256-57. Article 2 
states in pertinent part: "[t]he Community shall have as its task ... to promote throughout 
the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment . ... " [d. (emphasis added). 
178 See id.; see generaUy Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A 
Comment, 102 YALE LJ. 2123 (1993); see also p.s. Elder, Sustainability, 36 MCGILL LJ. 831, 831 
(1991). 
179 But see Council Regulation 1210/90 Establishing the European Environment Agency, 
1990 oj. (L 120) 1. The European Environment Agency (EEA) could provide expert analysis 
and hard evidence of damage to the environment. The ECl most likely will interpret this 
regulation to allow the EEA broad investigatory powers and possibly enforcement powers 
under article 20. The ECl could in turn use the information to determine what kind of 
development is sustainable when the issue inevitably comes before it. 
ISO Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 130r(2), 31 I.L.M. at 285. 
181 See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. at 4607. 
182 EEC 'TREATY arts. 100a(4), 130t. 
183 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, tit. VII, art. 3B, 31 I.L.M. at 257-258. 
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national level, and such action must be done in the least restrictive 
manner. 
Without prejudice to other areas of EC law, the principle of 
subsidiarity should not result in a shift of power away from EC 
institutions in the area of enacting environmental legislation. The 
problems of environmental protection cannot be addressed ade-
quately within the rigid system of separate sovereign states. 184 Sub-
sidiarity really is about protecting sovereignty, but "the notion of 
sovereignty which underlies the current regime poses insurmount-
able obstacles when the problems to be addressed are transnational 
in scope."185 Because problems of environmental protection are 
largely transboundary in nature (pollution does not recognize a 
nation's sovereign border), there are compelling reasons for devel-
oping environmental protection policies primarily at the Commu-
nity level. The ECl's approach to the ambiguities and lacunae in EC 
law almost always results in a decision that strengthens the effective-
ness of a Community environmental protection policy. Thus, when 
the ECJ is confronted with the principle of subsidiarity within the 
context of Member State and Community environmental protection 
policy, it is likely to give it a narrow application and rule that the 
Community institutions, not the individual Member States, are the 
appropriate bodies for adopting environmental legislation. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT EFFECT, AND ENVIRONMENT 
Application of the doctrine of "direct effect" is particularly impor-
tant in the area of environmental protection, as a large majority of 
EC environmental policy is implemented in the form of Directives.186 
The ECJ consistently has held that Directives which impose suf-
ficiently precise, clear, and unconditional obligations upon a Mem-
ber State, without requiring further Member State action, may give 
rise to rights and obligations that individuals can rely on in actions 
before their national courts. 187 Additionally, a Member State may not 
rely, as against individuals, on its failure to perform obligations 
184 See generally Lawrence Sperling and Ira Feldman, The Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Waste: Implementation and Enforcement of Control Regimes in the European Community, 
22 ENVTL. L. REp. 10701 (1992). 
185 Sands, Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L LJ. 393, 393 
(1989); see also Sperling & Feldman, supra note 184, at 10701. 
186 See Declaration on Article 100a by the Conference of the Representatives of the Govern-
ments of the Member States, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 24. 
187 See generally Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337. This decision 
exemplifies the ECl's dynamic approach to interpreting EC law. The doctrine of direct effect 
is not mentioned in the Treaty, but rather is created by the EC]. 
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which a Directive entails.188 Thus, enforcemen t of EC environmental 
legislation may be achieved substantially by individuals and common 
interest groups bringing actions against Member States, and emana-
tions thereof, before their national courts.189 
An individual may rely on the provisions of a directly effective 
Directive in bringing an action against a Member State in a national 
court. 190 In Foster v. British Gas, the ECl gave a broad interpretation 
to what constitutes the "State," and included certain utilities opera-
tors.l9l The ECl's ruling in Foster represents a significant develop-
ment for the enforcement of Community environmental laws, as 
such a broad definition of the "State" potentially could reach the 
actions of gas, nuclear, coal, and other energy suppliers, as well as 
the water companies. For example, an individual that suffers harm 
from drinking water provided by the State run water authority will 
be able to bring an action in the national court against that authority 
if the water is not up to Community standards.192 
A recent ECJ decision raised the possibility that an individual, like 
one harmed from drinking impure water, may be able to recover 
damages as a remedy. In the joined cases of Frankovich and Bonifaci 
v. Italian Republic, the ECJ held that individuals who were owed 
back-pay by their insolvent employer could collect money damages 
from the State.193 In this case, Italy failed to implement a Directive 
on the approximation of Member State laws relating to the protec-
tion of employees whose employers become insolvent. 194 Although 
the ECJ held that the Directive did not give rise to directly effective 
rights, it further held that Italy's failure to implement the Directive 
infringed EC law, that the applicant's injury flowed directly from 
that infringement, and that the applicant therefore was entitled to 
money damages. 195 Although the Treaty does not contain any lan-
guage about the awarding of money damages, the ECJ concluded 
188 Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629. 
189 See Cameron, Environmental Public Interest Litigation, CECLD Series-EC Environmental 
and Planning Law at 18 (1991). 
190 Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723; see Opinion 
of Advocat~enera1 Slynn, Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzant Munster-Innestadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53. 
191 Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. 3343. 
192 Council Directive 80/778, 1980 OJ. (L 229) 11. Kramer argues that the Directive on the 
Quality of Drinking Water is sufficiently precise and unconditional to give rise to directly 
effective rights. Kramer, The Implementation of EC Environmental Directives within Member 
States: Some Implications of the Direct Effect Doctrine, 3 J. ENVTL. L. 39,43 (1991). 
193Frankovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 5357. 
194 Id.; see Council Directive 80/987, 1980 OJ. (L 283) 23. 
195 See generally Frankovich, 1991 E.C.R. 5357; see also Case 22/87, Commission v. Italy, 1989 
E.C.R. 143, where the ECJ declared that Italy failed to comply with its Community obligations 
by not implementing the Insolvency Directive. 
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that the principle of liability of the State for damage caused to 
individuals by infringements of Community law is inherent in the 
scheme of the Treaty.196 
This decision fills a lacuna in EC law. The ability to award damages 
when a Member State fails to meet its obligations under EC law 
essentially provides "teeth" to the ECl's powers under articles 169 
and 170.197 Thus, if a Member State fails to implement a Community 
Directive aimed at environmental protection and an individual suf-
fers harm from exposure to the part of the environment which the 
Directive was meant to regulate, that individual will have a strong 
case for collecting damages from the Member State. 198 The prospect 
of financial liability will in turn prompt Member States to implement 
environmental Directives in a timely and proper manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The net result of the ECl's jurisprudence has been an increase in 
Community awareness of environmental issues and an increased 
effectiveness of Community measures designed to protect the envi-
ronment. The ECJ's judgments in Titanium Dioxide and Waste 
Directive clarifY some of the controversy surrounding the proper 
legal basis of Community secondary environmental legislation. The 
ECJ's decisions will have a generally positive effect on EC environ-
mental policy. Article 100a will remain a viable legal basis for envi-
ronmentallegislation, thus potentially extending qualified majority 
voting. The ECJ most likely will interpret the new Maastricht legal 
basis provisions in a manner consistent with its previous jurispru-
dence, while simultaneously promoting the European Parliament's 
new co-decision powers with the Council. The ECl's decisions in 
Waste Oils and Danish Bottles illustrate a willingness to promote the 
EC's environmental protection policies, even when they may conflict 
with another fundamental principle of EC law. Thus, Maastricht's 
incorporation of the principle of sustainability raises environmental 
196Case 22/87, Commission v. Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 143; see EEC TREATY art. 5. The ECJ 
concluded that one of the Member States' "obligations" under the Treaty included remedying 
the financial consequences of their own infringement of EC law. Case 22/87, Commission v. 
Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 143. 
197 See EEC TREATY arts. 169-171. The EC]'s power under these articles merely is to declare 
that a Member State has not met its obligations under the Treaty, while the Member State is 
required to "take the necessary measures" to comply. EEC TREATY arts. 169-17l. The language 
does not evidence any powers of enforcement. 
198 See Josephine Steiner, From Direct Effects to Frankovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement of 
Community Law, 18 EUR. L. REv. 3, 11 (1992). 
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protection to co-equal status with the EC's policy on economic 
integration. On the other hand, Maastricht's inclusion of subsidiar-
ity is not very significant from the perspective of the environmental 
protection policy because the inherently trans boundary nature of 
pollution and other dangers to the environment requires the con-
tinued development of environmental protection policy primarily at 
the Community level. Finally, the ECl's decisions in Foster and Frank-
ovich will have a profound influence on the way EC environmental 
policy is enforced. Both cases expand the category of potential 
Member State defendants in actions brought by individuals before 
the national courts, and create the possibility of collecting money 
damages from Member States who fail to implement Community 
environmen tal Directives properly. 
